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# **Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert**

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**Supplement  
November 1987**

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*DI WAMPA 87-004C*

*November 1987*

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# Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert

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This paper was prepared by and coordinated within  
the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries  
are welcome

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## Preface

This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely updates of ongoing active measures and propaganda campaigns by the USSR and its allies. This issue covers the period 15 August 1987 to 15 November 1987. It is also designed to provide warning of future campaigns. The quarterly is composed of four parts:

- A perspective, which provides a look at recent trends in active measures.
- Brief overviews of both worldwide and regional campaigns.
- Articles containing detailed analyses of trends in the entire political influence arena—active measures, propaganda, and public diplomacy—and speculation on future developments.
- An annotated calendar of key events that we anticipate will figure prominently in campaigns by the Soviets and their allies.

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Article

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Libyan and Soviet Front Groups:  
Fellow Travelers

Over the past few years, Libyan and Soviet front groups have established extensive organizational ties and provided one another with financial and material assistance. Moscow has used the linkages as a nondiplomatic channel to show support for Tripoli and as a way to secure Libyan funding for Soviet fronts. Tripoli has used the ties to develop contacts with pro-Soviet Communist parties and peace groups in Greece and Portugal, where it shares Moscow's interest in removing US military bases. Although Soviet-Libyan front activities have not had a significant political impact in Greece or Portugal, we expect Moscow and Tripoli to continue and perhaps increase their cooperation there because US basing agreements in both countries will probably be under negotiation in 1988. Outside the Mediterranean, we believe the Soviet-Libyan front relationship is tenuous. Libyan fronts have been pursuing policies in the Caribbean and the South Pacific that are inconsistent with Soviet interests, and Moscow probably would reduce cooperation dramatically if Tripoli tried to use Soviet fronts to further its efforts in these areas.

Front Group Linkages

there are extensive organizational ties between Soviet and Libyan front groups. Within the past several years, Tripoli has established counterparts or national affiliates for two major Soviet fronts, the World Peace Council (WPC) and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO).<sup>1</sup> Libya is represented on the WPC Presidential Committee—which runs the organization on a day-to-day basis—and is the headquarters for a WPC women's front, according to the US Mission to the UN. Next year Tripoli will host the AAPSO Congress, a quadrennial event that serves as AAPSO's highest organ.

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Motives for Cooperation

We believe Tripoli is the driving force behind Soviet-Libyan front cooperation because it wants to tap into Moscow's extensive front group apparatus in the West. Cooperation with Moscow gives Libya access to pro-Soviet Communist parties in Western Europe, which are almost always heavily involved in Soviet front activities. Moreover, Libya can meet other Westerners by having Soviet fronts sponsor meetings that Tripoli influences or dominates.

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Article

**International Secretariat for Solidarity With the Arab People and Their Central Cause Palestine**

ISS, founded in Lisbon in 1979, serves as Libya's leading front organization, sponsoring five to six international anti-US conferences a year. Tripoli uses the ISS, a WPC affiliate, as the principal vehicle for cooperation with Soviet front groups.

Libya's willingness to pump money into Soviet fronts at a time when several of them are experiencing financial problems

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**The Go-Between**

Umar al-Hamdi, the head of ISS, has been at the center of Soviet-Libyan front cooperation.

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In our judgment, Hamdi has played a crucial role in the development of the relationship. His slavish devotion to Soviet interests probably has tempered Soviet concern about Tripoli's unpredictability. The Soviets high regard for Hamdi was evident this September when he visited Moscow. Hamdi spoke with senior officials of the CPSU International Department—which oversees the Soviet front apparatus—and was quoted frequently in the Soviet media.

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**Activities Focused in Greece and Portugal**

Moscow and Tripoli appear to focus their joint front group activities in Greece and Portugal. Soviet fronts have longstanding campaigns against the US military bases there, while Tripoli apparently is very concerned that Washington will use its bases in these countries as staging areas for future attacks on Libya.

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Libya agreed in January 1986 to give money to the Moscow-line Greek Communist Party (KKE) to help the Greek peace movement in its campaign to remove the US military bases from that country.

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Nonetheless, we believe Moscow values the relationship because it provides a low-profile way of supporting Libya. For example, while Moscow gave little diplomatic backing to Qadhafi after the April 1986 US bombing raid, the WPC vigorously supported Libya through a visit to Tripoli by WPC President Romesh Chandra, a special plenary session of a WPC conference, and propaganda statements. We also believe that Moscow appreciates

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
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
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In Portugal, the ISS has developed ties to some elements of the pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and its peace front, the WPC-affiliated Portuguese Council for Peace and Cooperation (PCPC).

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
Soviet and Libyan fronts have not yet had a significant political impact in either Greece or Portugal, largely because the KKE and the PCP appeal to narrow audiences. Nonetheless, we believe Soviet and Libyan fronts can build on the linkages they have established in both countries.

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**Outlook**

With US basing rights in Greece and probably Portugal under review in 1988, we expect Soviet and Libyan fronts to continue and perhaps increase their joint activities in these countries over the next several months. Outside the Mediterranean, however, we believe the Soviet-Libyan front relationship is tenuous because Libyan front activity often is inconsistent with Soviet interests. For example:

pro-Soviet Communist party in Western Europe and usually acts according to Moscow's directives.



- In the Caribbean, the Libyans have established a coalition of leftist groups—the Caribbean Nation Movement—that is a rival to the Cuban-sponsored front in the region. The Soviets almost certainly do not want Tripoli competing with one of their loyal clients.

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**Article**

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- Libya has been using its most radical front—the World Anti-Imperialism Center—to try to build a subversive network in Australia and the small South Pacific islands. Moscow is making a determined effort to improve its diplomatic relations in the region and would not want any of its fronts associated with Libyan activities there.

the South Pacific. Moscow insists that its fronts hew to the Soviet foreign policy line, and any Libyan attempt to manipulate them probably would prompt Moscow to reduce cooperation dramatically. Moscow might even reassess the relationship if Libya replaced Hamdi with someone lacking his strong pro-Soviet credentials.

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Because Tripoli is providing substantial financial support for some Soviet fronts, it might be tempted to try to use them to further its efforts in the Caribbean and

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